# ETP Foundry — Security overview

**Version 0.1 · 28 September 2026**

A one-page summary of how the service is built and protected, including what is not yet in place.
A fuller vendor due-diligence pack is available on request under NDA.

## Hosting

- Google Cloud, region `us-central1`: the desk API, the hosted MCP and the vault deployer run on Cloud
  Run; our Canton DevNet validator runs on one Compute Engine VM. The website is on Firebase Hosting.
- The validator VM has no public SSH port. Operator access is through Cloud IAP only, with OS Login.
  Its ledger port is reachable only from the desk's own subnet.
- Everything is DevNet or public testnet. Nothing runs on any mainnet.

## Authentication and access

- **People** sign in with Google through Firebase Authentication, the only sign-in method. The e-mail
  must be verified and on the desk's roster; anyone else is refused.
- **Programs** use `ck_` API keys: 256-bit random, shown once, stored only as a SHA-256 hash, never
  logged. The hosted MCP (etpfoundry.com/mcp) uses the caller's own key and role.
- Six roles; route permissions are declared in one place and tested. The public, unauthenticated API
  is read-only.
- The in-console assistant acts with the signed-in user's own credentials and cannot write anything
  without the user's approval (see the AI-use disclosure).

## Secrets and keys

- Google Secret Manager is the only store for secrets. Services receive secret references, not values.
- Published reports are signed with ES256 (P-256). Public keys are at
  /.well-known/etpfoundry-signing-keys.json, and any report can be checked at etpfoundry.com/verify.
- Committee seats that sign at trust level L2 hold their own keys. Those keys never leave the seat.

## Encryption

- HTTPS for the site, API and MCP, with standard security headers on every path.
- Data at rest uses Google's default encryption. No customer-managed keys are configured.
- The link from the desk to our Canton participant is plaintext gRPC inside a private network,
  authenticated with a shared secret. Moving to TLS and OIDC is required before TestNet or MainNet.

## Monitoring

- The admin console shows chain-watcher and desk alerts (since 27 September 2026).
- There is no uptime check, paging tool or on-call rota yet.

## Assurance

- **No independent security audit** of the Daml packages, the backend or the EVM vault contracts has
  been performed. No SOC 2 or ISAE 3402 report exists.
- Internal reviews and their open findings are written down and available under NDA.

## Reporting a vulnerability

E-mail **security@etpfoundry.com** (also listed at etpfoundry.com/security.txt). We acknowledge within
2 business days. Please give us 90 days to fix an issue before disclosing it publicly. We do not take
legal action against good-faith research that avoids harm to data and service.

See also: incident response (incident-response-v0.1.md) and business continuity
(business-continuity-v0.1.md).

Lucilla, Inc., federal corporation no. 16699448, Toronto, trading as ETP Foundry.